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Previous literature largely ignores the heterogeneity of aid channels used by each single donor 
country. We estimate Tobit models to assess the relative importance of recipient need, 
recipient merit and self-interest of donors for various channels of official and private German 
aid across a large sample of recipient countries in 2005-2007. Our findings strongly 
underscore the need for a disaggregated analysis of aid allocation. Aid channels differ 
significantly in the extent to which need and merit are taken into account. Yet, the German 
case does not reveal unambiguously superior aid channels. Better targeted aid through some 
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 1.  Introduction 
Donor fragmentation may impede aid effectiveness by imposing high transaction costs on the 
recipient countries and absorbing scarce administrative resources especially in the poorest 
among them (Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima and Moore 2006; Bigsten 2006). Recipient countries 
typically have to deal with dozens of donor countries and multilateral aid agencies. However, 
the “aid architecture” can be fairly complex even for single donor countries, extending well 
beyond official agencies or ministries whose raison d’être is to grant aid.  The Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) accounted for just half of German (bilateral 
and multilateral) ODA in 2006-2007.
1 Essentially the same applies to Sweden where SIDA 
(Swedish International Development Agency) handled little more than half of the country’s 
total budget for development cooperation in 2005 (Dreher, Mölders and Nunnenkamp 2009).
2 
Official aid channels often include central government agencies with principal 
mandates other than international development cooperation, as well as regional and local 
bodies. In addition, private aid channels and public-private co-financing play an increasingly 
important role. The OECD’s Creditor Reporting System implicitly acknowledges the 
importance of donor fragmentation within DAC countries by offering to users of its extensive 
database the option of breaking down total aid into “channels.” However, doing so is of little 
practical use. About half of aid disbursed by all DAC countries in 2005-2007 remains “to be 
defined”, i.e., is not assigned to any specific channel. Moreover, the “public sector” that 
accounts for most of the rest is no further differentiated.  
Given the scarcity of relevant data, it is not surprising that the aid allocation literature 
has hardly addressed the question of whether the relative importance of “need, merit and self-
interest” (Hoeffler and Outram 2008), representing the three major motives underlying aid, 
differs between aid channels used by one particular donor country. The bulk of previous 
literature compares the allocation of total aid across donor countries, notably with respect to 
classifying DAC countries into altruistic and selfish donors. Recent studies include 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004), Berthélemy (2006), Dollar and Levin (2006), Nunnenkamp 
and Thiele (2006), Baulch (2006), Younas (2008), Hoeffler and Outram (2008), and Sawada, 
Yamada and Kurosaki (2008).
3 Donor countries have also been compared by analyzing the 
allocation of specific types of aid. For instance, Neumayer (2005) focuses on food aid, while 
Thiele, Nunnenkamp and Dreher (2007) cover sector-specific aid related to the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
                                                           
1 See: http://www.bmz.de/de/zahlen/imDetail/Mittelherkunft_der_bi-_und_multilateralen_ODA_2006-2007.pdf; 
accessed: July 2009. 
2 See also Nunnenkamp, Weingarth and Weisser (2009) on the case of Switzerland. 
3 For a review of earlier studies, see Neumayer (2003). 2 
The few papers that refer to aid channels in a donor country-specific context almost 
exclusively do so by comparing the allocation of aid through public and private channels.
4 
Dreher, Mölders and Nunnenkamp (2009) analyze Sweden’s aid delivery through (Swedish) 
NGOs. Schulpen (1997) provides an earlier and more detailed comparison of Dutch ODA and 
co-financed aid through clerical organizations in selected Indian states. Similarly, 
Nunnenkamp, Weingarth and Weisser (2009) are interested primarily in the distinction 
between Swiss ODA and Swiss NGO aid. However, these authors seem to be the first in 
considering various aid channels of one particular donor country. In particular, Swiss aid 
statistics allow for comparing the allocation of ODA from different public sources. Indeed, 
Nunnenkamp, Weingarth and Weisser find that it depends on the source of NGO funding as 
well as the choice of the official benchmark whether or not NGOs provide better targeted aid. 
The differentiation between public and private aid channels is of interest in order to 
assess the widely held view that NGO aid is better targeted to the needy than ODA.
5 NGOs 
may be closer to the poor by circumventing (often corrupt) governments. Moreover, NGO aid 
is less likely to be distorted by political and commercial self-interest that official donors tend 
to have when deciding on the allocation of ODA. On the other hand, NGOs may be reluctant 
to address the most entrenched forms of poverty and to work in particularly difficult local 
environments. Rather, they may have to demonstrate visible and short-term results in order to 
secure future funding through private donations and/or official co-financing. According to the 
principal-agent model of Fruttero and Gauri (2005), funding concerns – notably dependence 
on official refinancing - tend to weaken the incentives of NGOs to engage where they might 
be needed most. This could explain why Dreher, Mölders and Nunnenkamp (2009) find the 
poverty orientation of Swedish aid delivered through NGOs to be surprisingly weak. 
While the distinction between private and official aid channels may be blurred by co-
financing mechanisms, it would be equally simplistic to assume that aid allocation through the 
various official channels is driven by a uniform set of donor motives. As a matter of fact, 
individual donor countries such as Germany do not have full control over some aid channels. 
Debt relief provides a case in point: While the cancellation of repayment obligations related to 
ODA loans from particular donor countries counts as bilateral aid, debt relief efforts are often 
the result of multilateral negotiations (among members of the so-called Paris Club). As a 
                                                           
4 Raschky and Schwindt (2009) provide an exception. They find that international aid efforts to help relieve 
disasters depend on whether donors deliver this type of aid through bilateral or multilateral channels. OECD 
donors prefer bilateral channels if the recipient country struck by disaster is of commercial interest to them (in 
terms of trade and availability of oil resources).  
5 See Koch et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion of hypotheses related to the pros and cons of NGO aid 
compared to ODA. 3 
consequence, one would expect that such aid channels are less affected by commercial and 
political interests that national donors might have.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, local and regional bodies often decide over the 
allocation of part of a donor country’s ODA. As will be shown below, the German Länder 
(federal states) have a peculiar aid agenda due to the fact that education belongs to their core 
competences in the German federal system. This is likely to result in aid allocation criteria 
that differ from those driving ODA from central government agencies.  
Different criteria may apply even if central government agencies have the say over the 
allocation of ODA. This is fairly obvious in cases such as Switzerland where the State 
Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) represents an important official source of ODA 
(Nunnenkamp, Weingarth and Weisser 2009); SECO’s principal mandate is to  “ensure 
sustainable economic growth” in Switzerland, e.g., by helping “ensure access to all markets 
for Swiss goods and services and investment.”
6 However, the relative importance of need and 
merit, if not the donor’s self-interest, can also be supposed to differ between implementing 
agencies of the same central ministry. Various German agencies are handling different aspects 
of international development cooperation under the BMZ umbrella (see Section 2 for details). 
Taking recent donor statements at face value, merit should figure most prominently as a 
determinant of financial cooperation, compared to (project-specific) technical cooperation. 
For example, BMZ guidelines explicitly state that general budget support should be granted 
primarily to well governed recipient countries (BMZ 2008). By contrast, emergency aid may 
be driven exclusively by need and is most unlikely to reward better governed recipient 
countries. 
In summary, analyzing aid allocation on the basis of aggregate aid statistics is likely to 
blur significant differences between aid channels. Aid from a single donor country can be 
expected to reveal as much heterogeneity as the well known comparisons across donor 
countries. This proposition is tested in the following for the case of Germany, which ranked 
third among all DAC donor countries with disbursed aid in the order of US$ 33 billion in 
2005-2007.
7 We discuss data issues and method in Section 2. Results are presented in Section 





                                                           
6 Quotes are from: http://www.seco.admin.ch/org/00686/index.html?lang=en; accessed: July 2009. 
7 Data from: http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/; accessed: July 2009. 4 
 
2.  Data and estimation approach  
German aid channels 
We combine two datasets on various channels through which German aid is delivered. The 
first source is a detailed account of bilateral ODA across recipient countries.
8 In addition to 
separating financial cooperation from technical cooperation, this source further refines the 
channels through which the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) offers technical cooperation – including through refinancing private donors such as 
clerical organizations, political foundations and other NGOs. Public sources other than BMZ 
and its implementing organizations are also listed separately, e.g., other ministries (notably, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the federal states. Finally, emergency aid as well as aid 
by means of debt relief and restructuring is separated from regular aid channels.  
The second source provides a comparable format for NGO aid proper, i.e., the 
allocation of the German NGOs’ own resources raised through donations, sales and 
membership fees. These data are collected by the Statistisches Bundesamt for a large number 
of German NGOs; about 500 organizations participated in the survey for 2007.
9 In contrast to 
BMZ’s refinancing of private donors, NGO aid proper cannot be differentiated into clerical 
organizations and other NGOs. Moreover, coverage may still be less than complete, but we 
are not aware of any other major donor country providing similarly rich information on the 
cross-country allocation of NGO aid proper.
10 
The data available from these sources cover just three years, 2005-2007, which 
prevents us from analyzing aid allocation in a panel context. On the other hand, coverage of 
aid recipients is complete, with all low- and middle-income countries being listed for all 
channels of aid. This allows us to consistently compare the allocation of aid between (i) 
different public agencies, (ii) official and private donors, and (iii) self-financed and officially 
refinanced NGO aid. 
These comparisons are clearly relevant as several channels play a quantitatively 
important role for German aid (Figure 1). Debt relief accounted for almost 45 percent of total 
                                                           
8 Note that, at the time of writing this paper (July 2009), the data used here were not available from the English 
version of BMZ’s website; for 2007 data see:   
http://www.bmz.de/de/zahlen/imDetail/Bilaterale_ODA_nach_Instrumenten_und_Laendern_2007_im_Detail.pd
f (accessed: June 2009). 
9 Personal communication with Statistisches Bundesamt and BMZ. The NGOs’ response ratio was about 50 
percent.  Participation of NGOs is voluntary, with an increasing number of organizations having provided data in 
recent years; see also Dietz and Gude (2007). Hence, it would make sense to focus on 2005-2007 even if data for 
NGO aid were available for earlier years. 
10 The data made available to us are aggregated over all participating NGOs. To the best of our knowledge, 
Switzerland is the only DAC member that publishes NGO-specific data on the cross-country allocation of NGO 
aid proper; for details, see DCC (various issues). 5 
bilateral German ODA of € 17.4 billion in 2005-2007. This is due to some exceptionally large 
relief operations, notably for Iraq in 2005 and 2007 (€ 3.1 billion) and Nigeria in 2005 and 
2006 (€ 2.4 billion). By contrast, (regular) financial cooperation plays a minor role when 
considering net disbursements as in Figure 1 (i.e., loan repayments, sales of equity shares held 
by DEG,
11 etc., are subtracted from gross disbursements). In the estimations performed below, 
we use an alternative measure of financial cooperation, namely financial grants.
12 The sum of 
grants in 2005-2007 amounted to € 2.1 billion, compared to net financial cooperation of € 0.9 
billion. 
German ODA involves several implementation agencies, funded by BMZ, focusing on 
financial cooperation (KfW banking group, including DEG), technical cooperation (GTZ) and 
human resource development (InWEnt, DED, CIM). Apart from these well-known ODA 
channels, BMZ refinances private donors. BMZ funds delivered through clerical 
organizations, political foundations and other NGOs amounted to €1.26 billion in 2005-2007, 
representing 7.2 percent of total bilateral ODA.  
While BMZ is funding about 35 percent of net disbursements of German bilateral 
ODA, other federal ministries as well as the German states are relevant actors, too.
13 Aid at 
the state level is largely restricted to financing scholarships for students from developing 
countries. Among other federal ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs figures most 
prominently.
14 This offers an interesting comparison with BMZ’s aid allocation, especially on 
whether BMZ focuses more on poorer recipient countries than other ministries for which 
political and strategic motivations may loom larger.  
Finally, NGO aid proper (including aid from clerical organizations and foundations, to 
the extent that those took part in the aforementioned survey) contributes considerably to 
German bilateral aid. In 2005-2007, NGOs spent own resources almost in the order of the net 
disbursements channelled through BMZ’s major official implementing organizations. Adding 
up NGO aid proper and officially refinanced aid of clerical organizations, political 
                                                           
11 DEG (Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft) is part of KfW banking group. Inter alia, DEG 
carries out loan programmes, supporting investment projects in developing countries, on behalf of the German 
federal government. 
12 In contrast to loans and DEG equity participation, grants constitute a net financial transfer by definition. Net 
financial cooperation, including loans and repayments, is negative in various cases. Setting all these observations  
equal to one, in order to be able to take logs, may bias the data. This is why we prefer grants as a measure of 
financial cooperation. 
13 BMZ’s share in bilateral ODA rises to about 50 percent (2006/07) when financial cooperation with respect to 
market-related loans and repayments are separated from BMZ accounts 
(http://www.bmz.de/de/zahlen/imDetail/Mittelherkunft_der_bi-_und_multilateralen_ODA_2006-2007.pdf; 
accessed: July 2009) 
14 See: http://www.bmz.de/de/zahlen/imDetail/Mittelherkunft_der_bi-_und_multilateralen_ODA_2006-
2007.pdf; accessed: July 2009.  6 
foundations and other NGOs, NGOs allocate almost 22 percent of overall (public plus private) 
bilateral aid.  
It remains open to question, however, whether the involvement of NGOs has 
strengthened the poverty orientation of German aid. The share of aid that the various channels 
provide for Sub-Sahara Africa may offer first clues in this regard. The need for aid is clearly 
most urgent in this region where two thirds of all low-income countries are located (World 
Bank classification). At the same time, less than one third of Sub-Sahara African countries do 
not fall into the low-income category. The region also stands out in that more than 40 percent 
of its population were still living on less than one dollar a day in 2004.
15 
Nevertheless, less than 30 percent of NGO aid proper flows to Sub-Sahara Africa 
(Figure 2). The focus on the neediest region is still weaker for BMZ funds channelled through 
German NGOs, except for BMZ financing of aid projects administered by clerical 
organizations. The same applies to ODA from federal ministries other than BMZ and the 
German states. On the other hand, BMZ-funded official channels of financial and technical 
cooperation, including human resource development, deliver a relatively high share of ODA 
to Sub-Sahara Africa.
16 However, multivariate regression analyses are required to gain deeper 
insights into the poverty orientation of different types of aid. 
Before introducing the independent variables capturing different aid motivations and 
specifying our estimation approach, we present pair-wise correlations between per-capita aid 
delivered through different channels in Table 1. The cross-country allocation of BMZ funds 
through regular official channels (financial cooperation, technical cooperation through GTZ, 
human resource development) appears to be fairly similar, as far as simple correlations can 
tell. The same applies to several correlations of these regular official channels with BMZ 
refinancing of private donors (as well as “other technical cooperation”). In some contrast to 
what we suspected above, aid allocation by other ministries is relatively strongly correlated 
with BMZ-funded financial and technical cooperation.  
On the other hand, aid by means of debt relief is clearly distinct, which is not 
surprising as  major relief operations involved a limited number of recipient countries in the 
period under consideration. Correlations of emergency aid with most other aid channels are 
also weak, except for BMZ refinancing of clerical organizations and NGOs’ own resources. 
The allocation of NGOs’ own resources is rather weakly correlated with most other aid 
channels. 
                                                           
15 See: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGLOMONREP2008/Resources/4737994-1207342962709/251-
268_GMR08_mdg_web.pdf; accessed: June 2009. 
16 This also holds for financial cooperation when considering financial grants, rather than net disbursements of 
grants and loans as in Figure 2; Sub-Sahara Africa received 38 percent of grants. 7 
 
 Explanatory variables  
The sample underlying the subsequent analysis consists of 152 countries listed by BMZ and 
Statistisches Bundesamt as potential recipients of German aid. However, we lose some 
observations due to data limitations with regard to possible determinants of aid allocation. As 
concerns the need for aid, we employ three indicators to assess the poverty orientation of aid 
delivered through different channels. In line with most previous studies, we choose (log) GDP 
per capita as our standard indicator of need. Alternatively, we consider the infant mortality 
rate. It is widely acknowledged that average incomes may capture recipient need at best 
partly, which leads Younas (2008) to apply infant mortality as an indicator of “physical 
need.”
17 We also use the UNDP’s Human Development Index, which provides a broader 
measure of need by including life expectancy at birth, literacy rates, and school enrolment 
rates, next to GDP per capita.  
Similar to Hoeffler and Outram (2008), we consider the merit for aid to be related to 
the recipient countries’ quality of governance. This is based on Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) 
reasoning that aid tends to be more effective in countries with better policies and reasonably 
well developed institutions. The quality of governance is measured in alternative ways. Our 
preferred measure is “voice and accountability” taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2005). This index takes higher values if democratic institutions are better developed. 
Alternatively, we use the combined average ratings of political rights and civil liberties by 
Freedom House (2006), ranging from 1 – 7, with higher values indicating less democratic 
governance. While these two indicators proxy for democracy, we also employ an indicator 
capturing important aspects of economic institutions: the rule of law index from Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005); higher scores reflect better environments. Control of corruption 
comes from the same source. Finally, we make use of the Failed States Index available from 
the Fund for Peace.
18 While this index provides a broader measure of state failure than more 
specific institutional conditions, the index also covers aspects of recipient need for aid; e.g., 
one of the indicators reflects “uneven economic development along group lines.” 
To check whether the allocation of aid is shaped by commercial and political self-
interest of donors we include (i) the share of the recipient country in German exports to all 
sample countries and (ii) the degree of voting coincidence between the recipient country and 
                                                           
17 Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) also include infant mortality as a determinant of aid allocation. However, these 
authors regard infant mortality as indicating social policy outcomes and expect its coefficient to be negative (i.e., 
higher mortality leading to less aid). 
18 http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140; accessed: 
July 2009. 8 
Germany in the United Nations General Assembly. These variables are standard in the recent 
aid allocation literature (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000; Fleck and Kilby 2006; Nunnenkamp 
and Thiele 2006; Hoeffler and Outram 2008). 
In  Robustness and Extensions of Section 3 below, we introduce some additional 
factors that may shape the allocation of aid. In particular, the severity of disasters as well as 
ODA granted by other DAC countries are included in extended versions of the basic Tobit 
models. Instead of ODA granted by other DAC countries, we include BMZ-funded technical 
cooperation (excluding BMZ refinancing of private donors) as a factor that may influence the 
allocation of NGO aid proper and, in particular, officially refinanced private aid. Finally, in 
all specifications, we include the recipient countries’ (log) population as an independent 
variable since the dependent aid variables are defined in absolute terms. 
Some of the explanatory variables may not be exogenous, e.g., if effective aid helps 
raising the per-capita income of recipient countries. Note, however, that reverse causation is 
unlikely to distort our empirical results. Large parts of aid are generally unlikely to have 
short-term effects on economic outcomes and institutional conditions (Clemens, Radelet and 
Bhavnani 2004; Burnside and Dollar 2004). Furthermore, sums delivered through specific 
German aid channels are most probably too small to shape economic outcomes and 
institutional conditions in countries that typically receive aid from dozens of countries and 
various private donors. Nevertheless, essentially all our explanatory variables are lagged, 
referring to 2004 whenever possible. Exact definitions and sources as well as summary 




In our regression analysis, we take (logged) amounts of aid rather than aid per capita as the 
dependent variables.
19 This reflects the fact that donors are more likely to allocate a fixed 
overall amount of money per country than distributing aid on a per-capita basis (e.g., 
Neumayer 2003). 
The disaggregation of German aid yields many zero observations in our data; the 
number of countries receiving aid depends on the channel through which aid is delivered. To 
account for this distinguishing feature of our dependent variables, we adopt Tobit estimations 
as OLS estimations would be biased.  
                                                           
19 Note that there are some negative values of ODA total as well as various zero observations. To avoid any loss 
of observations, we set the negative values equal to 0 and add up 1 to all values before taking the logarithm. 9 
We assess the effects of the explanatory variables on aid allocation through the various 
channels by estimating a Tobit model for each single aid channel. Furthermore, we estimate 
SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) to address the issue of comparing coefficients across 
several regressions. More precisely, it allows us to test the equality of the coefficients.
20 
The basic specification of the Tobit estimation is defined as follows: 
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Note that the coefficients βj (reported in Appendices 4-6) cannot be interpreted directly in the 
context of the nonlinear Tobit model. Instead, we are interested in the marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables on E(Aidi|xi).






In our basic Tobit model, we capture the need for aid by the recipient country’s per-capita 
GDP. Merit is proxied by the quality of democratic institutions as given by voice and 
accountability from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. Donor self-interest 
is taken into account by the recipient country’s relative importance as a German export 
market and by the degree of its UN voting coincidence with Germany. The results are 
reported in Table 2 for essentially all German aid channels for which data exist.
23 
One striking finding has to be noted before turning to our variables of principal 
interest, i.e., the coefficient of population for which we control for the reasons given above. In 
sharp contrast to conventional wisdom, the coefficient is larger than one for all aid channels. 
For some channels, we even find a marginal effect of about three percent. In other words, 
German aid in 2005-2007 reveals a strong large-country bias, rather than the typically found 
                                                           
20 As the results of the SUR do not substantially differ from the results of the single regressions, we do not report 
them. 
21 We limit our analysis to the overall marginal effects. The two other marginal effects, on P(Aidi|xi) and 
E(Aidi|xi,Aidi>0), are available on request. 
22 Note that the marginal effects can be interpreted as elasticities when the dependent and independent variables 
are in logs. Likewise, we get semi-elasticities when the independent variable is in levels. 
23 We exclude BMZ refinancing of political foundations as well as aid for foreign refugees in Germany. The 
sums for the latter type of aid are marginal (€ 10-15 million annually in 2005-2007). The former type involves 
slightly higher sums than BMZ refinancing of clerical organizations (see Figure 1), but about 80 percent of total 
BMZ refinancing of political foundations is not allocated to specific recipient countries in the database, possibly 
because the political foundations cover various neighbouring countries from regional representative offices. 10 
small-country bias.
24 Closer inspection of the data reveals that huge recipient countries such 
as China and India received fairly low German aid in per-capita terms, as one would expect. 
Rather, the large-country bias appears to be due to various small countries with populations of 
less than one million not having received any German aid in 2005-2007. It is also interesting 
to note in this context that the BMZ came up with the so-called anchor country concept during 
the period under consideration here.
25 The 15 anchor countries, considered to be indispensable 
partners for global development, are all fairly populous. 
The extent to which the allocation of aid is needs-based differs considerably between 
German aid channels. Aid through some channels is not at all related to need. Various debt 
relief operations were orchestrated for middle-income countries, including upper middle-
income countries such as Serbia & Montenegro and Gabon. The disconnection from need of 
aid at the state level may be because the demand for scholarships is mainly from middle-
income countries where the incentives for human capital formation through studying abroad 
tend to be stronger than in poor subsistence economies.
26 The observation that German 
ministries other than BMZ lack any poverty orientation when allocating aid suggests that 
developmental concerns are blurred by broader (political or strategic) objectives of these 
donors.  
There are striking differences in the degree of poverty orientation even between those 
channels for which aid allocation is shown to be needs-based. The marginal effects of per-
capita GDP on aid by means of financial cooperation are clearly strongest. In quantitative 
terms, an increase in per-capita GDP by one percent decreases financial cooperation by 4.1 
percent. Testing for significant differences between the corresponding regression coefficients, 
financial cooperation proves more poverty oriented than technical cooperation at the one 
percent level. An increase in per-capita GDP by one percent reduces technical cooperation by 
1.1 percent. However, even within the spectrum of technical cooperation, the poverty 
orientation varies considerably. Interestingly, needs-based targeting of BMZ’s refinancing of 
NGOs is significantly stronger (at the one percent level) than the targeting of BMZ’s overall 
technical cooperation. At the same time, while German NGOs allocate their own resources 
according to need, targeting is significantly weaker than that of BMZ funds channelled 
                                                           
24 This cannot be attributed to the sources of aid data that we use here. We replicated the estimate for total 
German ODA with OECD data from its International Development Statistics, and again found the large-country 
bias for German aid in 2005-2007 (results not shown). The estimation results of Younas (2008) for total German 
ODA are also in conflict with the conventionally found small-country bias. 
25 See: http://www.bmz.de/en/countries/partnercountries/ankerlaender/index.html; accessed: July 2009. 
26 This may also explain why human resource development through technical cooperation by central government 
agencies such as DED and InWEnt (column 6 in Table 2) is less poverty orientated than other BMZ funds; this 
difference is significant at the five percent level. 11 
through NGOs. This finding is in some conflict with the widely perceived closeness of NGOs 
to the poor that should show up in the allocation of their own resources in the first place. 
Similarly pronounced differences can be observed between German aid channels with 
respect to merit determining aid allocation. The marginal effects of voice and accountability 
on financial grants are particularly strong. Likewise, some channels of technical cooperation 
are not only more needs-based than others, but at the same time more rewarding to countries 
with more democratic institutions. This applies especially to BMZ’s refinancing of NGOs. 
Also similar to need, the targeting according to merit of BMZ funds channelled through 
NGOs turns out to be significantly stronger (at the one percent level) than that of NGOs’ own 
resources.
27 This may also reflect, however, that NGOs are tempted to work in easier 
environments in particular when relying on official refinancing, as suggested by Fruttero and 
Gauri (2005). 
Note that debt relief is neither shaped by need nor by merit. Arguably, the former 
finding is because debt problems were concentrated in middle-income countries, while the 
poorest countries had received grants rather than ODA loans. However, the latter finding is 
rather puzzling, recalling donor statements according to which debt relief, e.g., in the context 
of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, was subject to strict conditions, 
including a national poverty reduction strategy developed through participatory processes.
28 
At the same time, the fairly ambiguous picture on the determinants of debt relief, together 
with the quantitative importance of this aid channel in recent years, clearly reveals the 
limitations of analyzing allocation of aggregate aid.  
In contrast to debt relief, it was to be expected that merit does not play a significant 
role for the allocation of emergency relief. Aid from other ministries is exceptional as 
countries with better developed democratic institutions get significantly less aid through this 
channel.  Especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have granted aid to countries such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan in order to promote democratization, rather than rewarding good 
governance.
29 These findings underscore the need for a disaggregated analysis of aid 
allocation. In other words, the heterogeneity across specific aid channels may at least partly 
explain the rather ambiguous findings of previous studies for overall German aid (Berthélemy 
and Tichit 2004; Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006; Hoeffler and Outram 2008).  
                                                           
27 As shown in column 13 of Table 2, merit affects the allocation of NGO aid proper only at the ten percent level. 
28 For details, see: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,contentMDK:20260411~menuP
K:64166739~pagePK:64166689~piPK:64166646~theSitePK:469043,00.html; accessed: July 2009. 
29 Twelve recipient countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan, each received annual aid of more than € 5 
million from other German ministries. The average indicator value of voice and accountability for this group was 
considerably below the overall sample mean (-0.73 versus -0.4). 12 
This is not to ignore some common features of aid allocation across almost all German 
aid channels. Most importantly, the results reported in Table 2 are in conflict with some 
previous studies according to which trade-related donor interest had significantly shaped the 
allocation of German aid (Berthélemy 2006; Hoeffler and Outram 2008).
30 Note that the 
present analysis is restricted to 2005-2007. Possibly, German donors have become more 
altruistic recently. The marginal effects of German exports on aid clearly differ between aid 
channels. But for none of the channels do we find that more aid was granted to more 
important export markets. It rather appears that German donors took the recipient countries’ 
absorption of German exports as another indication of their need for aid. 
In contrast to commercial motives, we find clear evidence for German political 
interests having shaped the allocation of aid through various channels. The marginal effect of 
UN voting coincidence is strongest for financial grants: An increase in the coincidence by one 
percent increases financial grants by 0.28 percent.
31 The corresponding coefficient is 
significantly higher (at the five percent level) than the coefficient for technical cooperation. 
Compared to technical cooperation tied to specific projects, financial cooperation involves 
more discretion of how to use aid and, thereby, offers greater benefits to recipient countries. 
This may induce donors to condition financial grants more strongly on political support by the 
recipient country (Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008).  
More surprisingly, aid granted by German ministries other than BMZ is not shaped in 
a stronger way by UN voting coincidence than BMZ’s technical cooperation. Some particular 
channels of technical cooperation are not affected by political self-interest as reflected in UN 
voting patterns. This applies especially to BMZ’s refinancing of clerical organizations and 
other NGOs. Similar to the case of Switzerland (Nunnenkamp, Weingarth and Weisser 2009), 
it appears that the NGO channel is sometimes used by official donors to deal with politically 
“less friendly” recipient countries. Likewise, debt relief is not affected by UN voting, possibly 
because relief operations are often orchestrated in a multilateral setting.  
 
Robustness and extensions 
We present two sets of robustness tests in Table 3 by employing (i) alternative measures of 
need and (ii) several institutional indicators to capture merit. To save space we only report the 
marginal effects of the alternative variables.
32 The effects of the remaining standard variables 
                                                           
30 However, trade-related self-interest did not result in higher German aid according to Berthélemy and Tichit 
(2004). 
31 Note that the variable UN votes is the share of voting coincidence between the recipient country and Germany 
in the United Nations General Assembly. 
32 Complete results are available on request. 13 
are hardly affected. A notable exception is that voice and accountability is no longer 
significant in the allocation of financial grants when replacing per-capita GDP by alternative 
measures of need. 
Measuring need by the more broadly based Human Development Index, instead of 
per-capita GDP, has little effect on previous findings. Once again, the poverty orientation of 
financial cooperation turns out to be significantly stronger (at the one percent level) than the 
poverty orientation of technical cooperation. Moreover, it remains that recipient need shapes 
the allocation of NGO-administered BMZ aid in a stronger way than the allocation of the 
NGOs’ own resources. Both findings also hold when replacing per-capita GDP by infant 
mortality as an indicator of physical need, although the coefficients of infant mortality are 
significantly different between financial and technical cooperation only at the ten percent 
level. More generally, infant mortality typically reveals somewhat weaker effects than per-
capita GDP and the HDI.   
 We also tried “uneven economic development along group lines” within the recipient 
countries, i.e., one of the elements of the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index as an indicator 
of need. We entered this indicator in addition to per-capita income. It takes higher values for 
countries with higher group-based inequality so that a positive coefficient would point to 
relative levels of poverty shaping the allocation of aid through a particular channel. The 
sample shrinks to 108 observations as the index is not available for various small countries, 
and we do not report detailed results. It should be noted, however, that we find some support 
for the view that NGOs are concerned about relative poverty when allocating their own 
resources. Uneven economic development also results in higher technical cooperation. 
Turning to alternative institutional indicators in the lower panel of Table 3, the results 
change only slightly when employing the rating of political and civil liberties by Freedom 
House.
33 This is not surprising as this is a measure of democratic institutions, as is voice and 
accountability. Notably, aid from other German ministries is once again an exception by 
favouring less democratic recipient countries.
34 As for the other two indicators from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, the results for control of corruption also 
resemble those for voice and accountability relatively closely. The coefficient turns 
insignificant in the estimation for NGOs’ own resources. Yet we find no evidence that 
German NGOs spend their own resources predominantly in countries with difficult 
                                                           
33 Note that Freedom House takes higher indicator values when democratic institutions are less advanced, in 
contrast to voice and accountability. 
34 The same still applies when replacing voice and accountability by the rule of law index that proxies for 
economic institutions. However, the coefficient of institutions turns insignificant for aid from other ministries for 
the remaining two indicators. 14 
institutional conditions. The rule of law index performs less well for various aid channels, 
probably because the focus of most donors is on broader political aspects of good governance. 
The results prove to be weakest when using the Failed States Index from the Fund for Peace. 
This index differs from the previous institutional measures as it covers a wider array of state 
failure. As mentioned before, the index even includes aspects of recipient need, for which we 
would expect a positive sign. Moreover, while donors may generally reward good 
governance, recent attempts at post-conflict resolution in countries ranking high in the Failed 
States Index involved considerable aid efforts, with the Dem. Rep. of Congo representing a 
prominent example. 
In Table 4, we return to the preferred set of measures of need and merit but extend the 
specification in two ways. First, we add the number of deaths caused by disasters in the 
recipient country, taken from the Emergency Events Database. This variable is expected to 
account for exceptional cases of need that may have significant effects of aid allocation 
through specific channels, notably emergency relief. Second, we follow previous studies such 
as Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and Berthélemy (2006) in that we account for ODA granted 
by all other DAC countries. This variable should affect the allocation of aid through German 
aid channels negatively if German donors specialized and avoided duplication of aid efforts. 
By contrast, a positive effect of this variable would indicate parallel behaviour, i.e., German 
donors adding to the widely perceived dichotomy between “aid darlings” and “aid orphans.” 
It is reassuring that the extensions of the basic Tobit models hardly affect the previous 
results for the standard set of aid determinants. This holds for all German aid channels under 
consideration. In some cases, the level of significance and the overall marginal effects decline 
slightly, but all major findings carry over to the extended versions. Nevertheless, there are 
some interesting additional insights from Table 4. 
The additional indicator of need, the number of deaths caused by disasters, has the 
expected positive effect on BMZ’s emergency aid (column 8 in Table 4). More surprisingly, 
disaster-related need does not result in more aid through any other aid channel. In particular, 
German NGOs do not direct more aid, by using either their own resources or BMZ 
refinancing, to recipient countries struck by more serious disasters. To the contrary, aid 
through some channels appears to be negatively affected by disasters. As concerns aid from 
German states as well as BMZ-funded human resource development, this may be due to less 
demand for scholarships and, more generally, human resource development under disaster 
conditions. However, we also find indications that emergency aid is not fully additional to 15 
regular aid, but tends to substitute for technical cooperation channels such as GTZ-
administered funds.
35 
None of the German aid channels allocates aid in a way that prefers the aid orphans of 
other DAC donors. Nevertheless, there are considerable differences between German aid 
channels with respect to parallel behaviour. It appears that parallel behaviour is predominantly 
a phenomenon among official aid agencies. By contrast, the allocation of NGO-administered 
ODA and NGOs’ own resources is unaffected by aid from DAC donors other than Germany.
36 
This does not imply, however, that German NGOs allocate aid in a fully autonomous way. 
The bottom line of Table 4 presents an additional estimation for the three aid channels 
involving private agents in which we replace aid from DAC countries by BMZ’s technical 
cooperation (netting out BMZ’s refinancing of private agents). It turns out that clerical 
organizations as well as other NGOs tend to replicate BMZ’s aid allocation. Not surprisingly, 
the NGOs’ autonomy is relatively strongly affected when allocating officially refinanced aid. 
The effect of BMZ aid on ODA funds administered by clerical organizations and other NGOs 
is significantly higher than the corresponding effect on the NGOs’ own resources at the one 
(clerical organizations) and five (other NGOs) percent level, respectively.
37  
 
4.  Summary and Conclusion 
Aid from a single donor country can be expected to reveal as much heterogeneity as the well 
known comparisons across (altruistic and selfish) donor countries. We address a major 
limitation of the aid allocation literature that largely ignores the variety of aid channels within 
particular donor countries. The relative importance of recipient need, recipient merit and self-
interest of donors – i.e., the three major motives driving aid - is supposed to differ not only 
between official aid and self-financed NGO aid proper but also across the various official aid 
channels, including publicly refinanced aid administered by private agents. 
We evaluate these propositions for the case of Germany which ranks among the top 
aid donor countries. We draw on two little known datasets providing an exceptionally detailed   
account of the cross-country allocation of aid through BMZ and its implementation agencies, 
other ministries, the federal states, officially refinanced private donors as well as German 
NGOs using their own resources. We estimate Tobit models to assess the marginal effects of 
need, merit and donor interest on aid allocation through all these channels in 2005-2007. 
                                                           
35 These results hold when measuring the severity of disasters by the number of people affected, instead of the 
number of deaths, even though marginal effects and the level of significance weaken somewhat (not shown).  
36 The same applies to aid from German states and other ministries. 
37 Recall that the NGOs’ own resources cannot be differentiated between clerical organizations and other NGOs. 16 
Our empirical findings strongly underscore the need for a disaggregated analysis of aid 
allocation. The extent to which aid allocation is needs-based differs significantly as SUR 
estimates attest. While the poverty orientation of BMZ-funded financial cooperation is clearly 
strongest, other ministries lack any poverty orientation – suggesting that developmental 
concerns tend to be blurred by other (political or strategic) objectives of these donors. German 
NGOs allocate their own resources according to recipient need but, surprisingly, this targeting 
turns out be relatively weak compared to that of BMZ technical cooperation funds channelled 
through private agents. 
Similarly pronounced differences between German aid channels are observed with 
respect to merit. Indeed, there is a striking parallel between our findings and those of Dollar 
and Levin (2006): Comparing donor countries as well as international agencies, Dollar and 
Levin conclude that the same group of multilateral and bilateral aid agencies that are poverty 
focussed are also rewarding merit of recipients. Likewise, some German aid channels are not 
only more needs-based than others, but at the same time more rewarding to countries with 
more democratic institutions or less corruption. 
This finding does not necessarily imply, however, that better targeted aid is purely 
altruistic. To the contrary, we find clear evidence for German political interests – though not 
export-related commercial interest - having shaped the allocation of aid through various 
channels. In particular, financial cooperation seems to be conditioned on political support by 
the recipient country in the UN General Assembly. This may be the price of financial grants 
offering greater benefits to recipient countries than project-tied technical cooperation. 
Taken together, the German case does not suggest that one particular aid channel is 
unambiguously superior in terms of targeting the needy and deserving as well as avoiding 
self-interest of donors to shape the allocation across recipient countries. The closeness of 
NGOs to the poor is less compelling than widely perceived. More flexible forms of ODA such 
as financial grants tend to involve a trade-off for the recipient between more discretion in how 
to use aid and more pressure to politically support the donor. Comparable analyses for other 
important donor countries would be desired to arrive at stronger policy conclusions. Hence, it 
would be extremely useful if the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System succeeded in filling the 
huge gaps in data availability concerning specific aid channels. 17 
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Figure 1 - German aid channels: Bilateral (net) disbursements of ODA and private aid



































InWEnt, DED, CIM  Hum. res development: € 686 mill.
Technical cooperation: € 1931 mill. 
Own resources: € 3228 mill.
Financial cooperation (net): € 871  KfW banking group, DEG 
Debt relief/ restructuring: € 7780 mill




€ 2293 mill; mainly scholarships
Official refinancing: € 500 mill.
Official refinancing: € 525 mill.
Official refinancing: € 231 mill.
Unspecified; PPP? Other techn. cooperation: € 539 
Emergency aid: € 303 mill.
Source of funding:  Implementing 
agency 
a Including amounts not allocated to particular recipient countries and regions. BMZ: Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development; CIM: Centrum für Internationale 
Migration und Entwicklung; DED: Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst; DEG: Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft; GTZ: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit; InWEnt: Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung. Source: BMZ, Statistisches Bundesamt 
Other ministries 
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TC, HR development (b,c)
all channels (d)




TC, refinancing of other NGOs (b)
ministries other than BMZ




aExcluding unallocated amounts for all channels. 
bPart of TC BMZ, total. 
cGerman Development Service (DED), Capacity Building 
International (InWEnt), Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM), etc. 
dIncluding minor channels not listed here. 
eTechnical cooperation by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit. 






Table 1 – Correlations between different channels of bilateral German aid across 152 recipient countries, € per capita, 2005-2007
a 
 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Fin. cooperation, net   (1)  1  0.63*** 0.40*** 0.25*** 0.43*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.30*** 0.12  0.43*** 0.12  -0.07  0.11 
Fin. cooperation, grants   (2)    1  0.58*** 0.34*** 0.58*** 0.29*** 0.34*** 0.42*** 0.15*  0.62*** 0.12  -0.02  0.18** 
Tech. cooperation, GTZ   (3)      1  0.62*** 0.44*** 0.66*** 0.34*** 0.62*** 0.14*  0.51*** 0.44*** -0.00  0.17** 
TC, HR development   (4)        1  0.57*** 0.22*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.02  0.19**  0.11  0.00  0.16* 
TC, refin. of clerical org.  (5)          1  0.15*  0.27*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.05  -0.02  0.20** 
TC, refin. of pol. found.   (6)            1  0.07  0.38*** -0.07  0.48*** 0.50*** 0.00  0.09 
TC,  refin.  of  other  NGOs  (7)         1  0.19**  0.08  0.10  -0.07  -0.03  0.18** 
Tech.  cooperation,  other    (8)          1  0.02  0.39*** 0.28*** 0.06  0.10 
BMZ  emergency  aid    (9)           1  0.18**  -0.10  -0.06  0.41*** 
Other  ministries   (10)            1  0.50*** 0.02  0.13 
States    (11)             1  0.09  0.01 
D e b t   r e l i e f     ( 1 2 )               1   - 0 . 0 6  
NGO  own  resources    (13)                1 
a Sum of aid in 2005-2007, related to recipient countries’ population in 2006 (2005 for 12 countries); ***, **, * = significant at the 1, 5, 10 level, respectively.  









Table 2 - Basic Tobit models: Overall marginal effects      
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
  ODA total  FC grants  TC BMZ  TC GTZ  TC HR 
TC refin. cl. 
org. 
TC refin. 




ministries States Debt  relief 
NGO own 
resources 
                                         
Population  1.650*** 2.347*** 2.162*** 3.055*** 1.967*** 3.148***  2.543*** 2.689*** 1.543*** 1.666*** 1.479*** 1.158*** 1.084*** 
 (0.213)  (0.389)  (0.191)  (0.317)  (0.181) (0.327)  (0.322) (0.322) (0.309) (0.133)  (0.125) (0.308) (0.139) 
Per-capita GDP  -0.821**  -4.144***  -1.103***  -1.562*** -0.711** -1.796*** -2.293***  -1.062* -1.812***  -0.011  0.269  0.244  -0.905*** 
 (0.392)  (0.712)  (0.350)  (0.560)  (0.331) (0.574)  (0.564) (0.568) (0.607) (0.243)  (0.230) (0.405) (0.257) 
Voice -0.330  2.472***  0.808*  2.189***  0.955**  2.473***  2.611***  1.250*  -0.730  -0.888***  -0.404  0.342  0.574* 
 (0.501)  (0.911)  (0.446)  (0.722)  (0.422) (0.737)  (0.734) (0.727) (0.640) (0.311)  (0.294) (0.501) (0.327) 
Export  share  -0.457***  -0.232  -0.377** -0.456** -0.338**  -0.708*** -0.257  -0.372 -1.871***  -0.223** -0.098 -1.705***  -0.207* 
 (0.165)  (0.270)  (0.145)  (0.225)  (0.137) (0.226)  (0.212) (0.225) (0.647) (0.102)  (0.096) (0.511) (0.107) 
UN votes  8.428  28.251***  13.825*** 13.781*  12.615*** 11.137 10.931 9.831  -0.993  12.606***  14.626*** 2.579 7.673** 
 (5.289)  (9.363)  (4.754)  (7.596)  (4.493) (7.702)  (7.563) (7.676) (7.265) (3.310)  (3.102) (5.116) (3.416) 
                
Observations  135 135 135 135 135 135  135 135 135 135 135 135 135 
Censored  obs.  11 48 15 33 15 44  58 42 76 11 7 108 5 
                       





Table 3 - Robustness tests: Overall marginal effects   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
  ODA total  FC grants  TC BMZ  TC GTZ  TC HR 










                                   
Robustness tests: need indicator           
HDI  -4.589*  -20.237*** -7.369*** -11.088***  -5.040**  -10.888*** -14.890***  -7.167**  -1.239  2.538  -5.214*** 
  (2.702) (4.600) (2.325) (3.329) (2.232) (3.652) (3.605) (3.560) (1.611) (1.540) (1.754) 
Infant  mortality  0.013 0.051***  0.024**  0.031** 0.015*  0.043***  0.042***  0.033**  0.007 -0.012**  0.022*** 
  (0.010) (0.019) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
             
Robustness  tests:  institutional  indicator           
Freedom 0.137  -0.833**  -0.294  -0.811***  -0.328*  -0.967*** -1.154***  0.397  0.385***  0.224*  -0.260* 
  (0.213) (0.383) (0.190) (0.306) (0.180) (0.311) (0.307) (0.268) (0.132) (0.124) (0.139) 
Law  -0.426  3.210***  0.641  1.930**  0.874 1.079 1.066 -0.688  -1.217***  0.020 -0.570 
  (0.623) (1.121) (0.560) (0.904) (0.531) (0.937) (0.917) (0.820) (0.382) (0.368) (0.408) 
Corruption  0.333  3.342*** 1.544** 2.866***  1.517*** 2.232**  1.984*  -0.379  -0.320  0.384  -0.321 
  (0.668) (1.248) (0.595) (0.980) (0.567) (1.025) (1.027) (0.939) (0.426) (0.394) (0.435) 
Failed  0.042 -0.046 -0.027 -0.035  -0.040*  -0.066 -0.083* 0.094*  0.014  -0.006  -0.003 
    (0.029) (0.056) (0.021) (0.039) (0.021) (0.046) (0.049) (0.050) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) 
             





Table 4 - Extended Tobit models: Overall marginal effects    
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
  ODA total  FC grants  TC BMZ  TC GTZ  TC HR 










                                   
Population  1.621*** 2.759*** 2.470*** 3.854*** 2.291*** 3.392*** 2.638***  0.794*  1.774*** 1.850*** 1.055*** 
  (0.336) (0.608) (0.270) (0.482) (0.257) (0.523) (0.525) (0.478) (0.196) (0.169) (0.200) 
Per-capita GDP  -0.732*  -3.975***  -1.042*** -1.269**  -0.610*  -1.455** -2.662*** -1.861***  -0.009  0.259  -0.764*** 
  (0.432) (0.771) (0.346) (0.580) (0.329) (0.626) (0.631) (0.636) (0.251) (0.217) (0.257) 
Voice  -0.250  2.666*** 0.932** 2.163*** 1.032** 2.466***  2.927***  -0.886  -0.803**  -0.340  0.532* 
  (0.527) (0.947) (0.421) (0.714) (0.401) (0.768) (0.776) (0.686) (0.307) (0.265) (0.314) 
Export  share  -0.435**  -0.232  -0.348** -0.481** -0.319** -0.736***  -0.232  -1.642** -0.204**  -0.084  -0.198** 
  (0.168) (0.272) (0.133) (0.217) (0.126) (0.230) (0.220) (0.700) (0.098) (0.084) (0.100) 
UN votes  4.608  27.126***  10.406**  8.481  9.055** 10.295  12.397  3.610  10.824***  9.134***  7.095** 
  (5.823) (9.727) (4.627) (7.594) (4.395) (8.077) (8.098) (7.612) (3.388) (2.929) (3.467) 
Disaster: deaths  -0.019  -0.480  -0.482**  -0.904***  -0.469** -0.216  -0.045 0.686**  -0.191 -0.491*** -0.054 
  (0.252) (0.433) (0.201) (0.338) (0.191) (0.364) (0.361) (0.312) (0.147) (0.127) (0.150) 
DAC  aid  0.012  0.329**  0.143** 0.200* 0.130** 0.245*  -0.005  0.176  0.055  -0.038  0.035 
  (0.084) (0.156) (0.067) (0.112) (0.064) (0.124) (0.117) (0.143) (0.049) (0.042) (0.050) 
             
Robustness  test:  other  aid            
TC  BMZ  pure         1.357***  1.068***       0.483*** 
         (0.271)  (0.259)       (0.057) 
             
Observations  125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 
Censored  obs.  9  42 11 27 11 38 51 69  8  4  3 
             
Standard  errors  in  parentheses;  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1.         26 
 
Appendix 1 – Definitions of variables and sources 
 Definition  Source 
All channels  Sum of all aid channels (ODA total plus NGO own resources), net flows, 
1000 €, annual average 2005-2007, logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 
ODA total  All ODA channels (sum of: FC net, TC BMZ, BMZ emergency, Other 
ministries, States, Debt relief, and minor items such as administrative 
costs), net flows, 1000 €, annual average 2005-2007, logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 
FC  net  Financial cooperation, net flows, 1000 €, annual average 2005-2007, 
logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 
FC  grants  Financial cooperation, grants (i.e., excluding loans and related 
repayments), 1000 €, annual average 2005-2007, logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 
TC  BMZ  Total technical cooperation funded by BMZ, 1000 €, annual average 
2005-2007; consists of: TC GTZ, TC HR, TC refin. cl. org., TC refin. 
pol. found., TC refin. NGO, TC other, logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt  
TC BMZ pure  TC BMZ – TC refin. cl. org. – TC refin. pol. found. – TC refin. other 
NGOs, logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 
TC  GTZ  Technical cooperation implemented by GTZ, 1000 €, annual average 
2005-2007, logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 
TC HR  Technical cooperation for human resource development implemented by 
InWEnt, DED, CIM, etc., 1000 €, annual average 2005-2007, logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 
TC refin. cl. 
org. 
BMZ refinancing of clerical organizations, 1000 €, annual average 2005-
2007, logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 
TC refin pol. 
found. 
BMZ refinancing of political foundations, 1000 €, annual average 2005-
2007, logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 
TC refin. other 
NGOs 
BMZ refinancing of German NGOs other than clerical organizations and 
political foundations, 1000 €, annual average 2005-2007, logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 





BMZ emergency aid, 1000 €, annual average 2005-2007, logged  BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 
Other 
ministries 
Aid from other federal ministries, 1000 €, annual average 2005-2007, 
logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 
States  Aid from Länder (states), 1000 €, annual average 2005-2007, logged  BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 





NGO aid proper, financed through own resources, 1000 €, annual 
average 2005-2007, logged 
BMZ; Stat.Bundesamt 
    
Population  Population of recipient country, 2004, in 1000, logged  World Bank WDI 
Per-capita 
GDP 
GDP per capita in recipient country, 2004, US$, logged  World Bank WDI 
Infant 
mortality 
Infant mortality per 1000 live births, 2005 (2004 not available for most 
recipient countries) 
World Bank WDI 
HDI  Human Development Index, 2004  UNDP,  Human  Development 
Report 2006 
Uneven  Uneven economic development within recipient country; one of the 12 
indicators used by Fund for Peace to construct its failed states index; 
based on evidence for 2005 (2006 for some countries not listed in 








Law  Rule of law index from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) project, 2004 
http://info.worldbank.org/governa
nce/wgi/index.asp 
Voice  Voice and accountability from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) project, 2004 
http://info.worldbank.org/governa
nce/wgi/index.asp 
Corruption  Control of corruption from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) project, 2004 
http://info.worldbank.org/governa
nce/wgi/index.asp  
Export share  German exports to recipient country i, share in German exports to all 
sample countries, 2004, percent 
IMF Direction of Trade 
UN  votes  Voting coincidence between recipient country and Germany in the 






Number of people affected by disasters in the recipient country, annual 
average 2004-2006,  in 1000, logged 
Emergency Events Database, 
http://www.emdat.be/ (accessed: 
July 2009) 27 
Disaster: 
deaths 
Number of deaths due to disasters in the recipient country, annual 
average 2004-2006, in 1000, logged 
Emergency Events Database, 
http://www.emdat.be/ (accessed: 
July 2009) 
Failed  Failed states index scores 2006 (based on evidence for 2005); index 
scores 2007 for some countries not listed in previous scores; range from 
















Appendix 2 - Summary statistics 
   Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
All channels  152 36 231 116 750 0  1 156 227
ODA total  152 31 697 115 795 0  1 154 920
FC grants  152 4 391 7 389 0  36 636
TC BMZ  152 6 214 8 943 0  49 686
TC GTZ  152 3 359 5 116 0  34 690
TC HR  152 1 132 1 724 0  10 871
TC refin. cl. org.  152 938 2 222 0  18 339
TC refin. other NGOs  152 252 671 0  6 930
TC other  152 328 506 0  3 491
BMZ emergency  152 570 1 529 0  11 496
Other ministries  152 1 641 3 188 0  23 109
States  152 4 831 16 988 0  186 814
Debt relief  152 17 060 114 344 0  1 142 945
NGO own resources  152 4 562 9 120 0  83 105
Population  152 33 950 138 533 1  1 296 158
Per-capita GDP  152 4 652 4 352 252  26 530
HDI 131 0.6 0.2 0.3  0.9
Infant mortality  139 49.8 37.5 5.2  159.7
Uneven 109 7.7 1.2 2.0  9.3
Voice 144 -0.4 0.8 -2.1  1.2
Freedom 142 3.8 1.8 1.0  7.0
Law 145 -0.5 0.7 -2.3  1.2
Corruption 143 -0.5 0.6 -1.8  1.4
Failed 109 81.5 15.6 32.0  112.3
Export share  140 0.7 2.4 0  22.5
UN votes  138 0.7 0.1 0.5  0.9
Disaster: affected  133 1 098.9 6 904.6 0  75 268.3
Disaster: deaths  133 1.0 5.7 0  59.0
DAC aid  152 189 458 360 212 0  3 530 430
TC BMZ pure  152 4 819 6 772 0  38 567
          28 
Appendix 3 - Correlation matrix                 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22)  (23)  (24)  (25)  (26)  (27) (28) (29) (30) 
(1) All channels  1.00
(2) ODA total  0.93 1.00
(3) FC grants  0.63 0.65 1.00 
(4) TC BMZ  0.73 0.78 0.75  1.00 
(5) TC GTZ  0.67 0.72 0.84  0.88  1.00 
(6) TC HR  0.70 0.75 0.74  0.97  0.86  1.00
(7) TC refin. cl. org.  0.61 0.63 0.67  0.76  0.75  0.76 1.00
(8) TC refin. other NGOs  0.51 0.55 0.60  0.66  0.63  0.65 0.69 1.00
(9) TC other  0.65 0.70 0.70  0.79  0.78  0.77 0.60 0.60 1.00
(10) BMZ emergency  0.38 0.41 0.50  0.48  0.44  0.44 0.54 0.46 0.41 1.00
(11) Other ministries  0.75 0.80 0.64  0.88  0.77  0.85 0.65 0.58 0.69 0.41 1.00
(12)  States  0.71 0.78 0.56 0.80 0.70 0.79 0.55 0.53 0.67 0.26 0.85 1.00
(13) Debt relief  0.32 0.34 0.29  0.29  0.27  0.28 0.29 0.32 0.31 0.17 0.27 0.27 1.00
(14) NGO own resources  0.77 0.70 0.62  0.84  0.72  0.82 0.67 0.59 0.63 0.46 0.75 0.74 0.25 1.00
(15)  Population  0.73 0.76 0.60 0.83 0.74 0.82 0.68 0.63 0.69 0.42 0.88 0.85 0.26 0.78 1.00 
(16) Per-capita GDP  -0.29 -0.34 -0.44  -0.33  -0.29  -0.26 -0.32 -0.33 -0.27 -0.57 -0.25 -0.14 -0.19 -0.28 -0.23  1.00 
(17)  HDI  -0.27 -0.30 -0.36 -0.30 -0.29 -0.21 -0.28 -0.31 -0.21 -0.49 -0.19 -0.01 -0.17 -0.28 -0.20  0.84  1.00
(18) Infant mortality  0.20 0.22 0.22  0.21  0.17  0.14 0.22 0.19 0.12 0.46 0.17 -0.03 0.10 0.25 0.15  -0.71  -0.91 1.00
(19)  Uneven  0.19 0.19 0.12 0.26 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.21 0.12 0.27 0.08 -0.03 0.17 0.36 0.28  -0.37  -0.39 0.38 1.00
(20)  Voice  -0.37 -0.43 -0.19 -0.33 -0.20 -0.28 -0.16 -0.12 -0.23 -0.41 -0.50 -0.39 -0.11 -0.31 -0.47  0.45  0.39 -0.38 -0.37 1.00
(21)  Freedom  0.32 0.37 0.14 0.28 0.16 0.25 0.11 0.05 0.22 0.36 0.46 0.38 0.04 0.25 0.44  -0.32  -0.30 0.30 0.29 -0.96 1.00
(22)  Law  -0.45 -0.49 -0.29 -0.43 -0.30 -0.36 -0.33 -0.29 -0.26 -0.48 -0.53 -0.36 -0.21 -0.48 -0.48  0.57  0.52 -0.53 -0.52 0.72 -0.63 1.00
(23)  Corruption  -0.35 -0.38 -0.26 -0.33 -0.23 -0.27 -0.26 -0.24 -0.22 -0.44 -0.42 -0.28 -0.21 -0.41 -0.43  0.55  0.47 -0.48 -0.51 0.71 -0.61 0.91 1.00
(24)  Failed  0.29 0.33 0.20 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.51 0.17 -0.07 0.16 0.24 0.19  -0.61  -0.56 0.50 0.72 -0.71 0.63 -0.77 -0.73 1.00
(25)  Export  share  0.03 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.17 0.18 -0.17 0.24 0.30 -0.08 0.10 0.39 0.19 0.21 -0.18 0.11 -0.02 0.06 0.11 0.09 -0.14 1.00
(26)  UN  votes  0.13 0.16 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.27 0.16 0.14 0.15 -0.09 0.27 0.34 0.02 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.36 -0.32 -0.26 0.17 -0.18 0.08 0.10 -0.32 0.14 1.00
(27) Dis: affected  0.38 0.40 0.34  0.51  0.42  0.50 0.51 0.52 0.42 0.41 0.51 0.35 0.14 0.47 0.60  -0.29  -0.24 0.16 0.27 -0.10 0.04 -0.35 -0.30 0.19 0.27 0.00 1.00 
(28) Dis.: deaths  0.52 0.54 0.39  0.55  0.48  0.52 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.44 0.62 0.51 0.28 0.52 0.78  -0.27  -0.26 0.22 0.35 -0.33 0.28 -0.38 -0.37 0.33 0.28 -0.13 0.69 1.00 
(29) DAC aid  0.22 0.22 0.34  0.28  0.27  0.26 0.27 0.18 0.23 0.30 0.22 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.18  -0.38  -0.36 0.31 0.22 -0.19 0.16 -0.31 -0.25 0.29 -0.01 -0.01 0.21 0.11 1.00 
(30) TC BMZ pure  0.73 0.79 0.76  1.00  0.89  0.97 0.75 0.65 0.81 0.48 0.88 0.80 0.30 0.83 0.82  -0.32  -0.29 0.19 0.23 -0.33 0.28 -0.41 -0.31 0.15 0.16 0.26 0.50 0.54 0.28 1.00 29 
 
 
Appendix 4 - Basic Tobit models: Coefficients     
                     
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
  ODA total  FC grants  TC BMZ  TC GTZ  TC HR 
TC refin. cl. 
org. 
TC refin. 




ministries States  Debt  relief 
NGO own 
resources 
                                         
Population 1.651***  2.813***  2.163***  3.158*** 1.967*** 3.527*** 3.504***  3.028*** 3.441*** 1.666*** 1.479***  9.578***  1.084*** 
  (0.213)  (0.482) (0.191) (0.335) (0.181) (0.387) (0.478) (0.378) (0.804) (0.133) (0.125) (2.832)  (0.139) 
Per-capita GDP  -0.821**  -4.966***  -1.103***  -1.615*** -0.712** -2.012***  -3.159*** -1.196*  -4.040***  -0.011 0.269 2.016  -0.905*** 
  (0.392)  (0.874) (0.350) (0.580) (0.331) (0.647) (0.789) (0.641) (1.236) (0.243) (0.230) (3.505)  (0.257) 
Voice -0.330  2.963***  0.808*  2.263***  0.955** 2.771***  3.596*** 1.407*  -1.627 -0.888*** -0.404  2.828  0.574* 
  (0.501)  (1.094) (0.446) (0.746) (0.422) (0.825) (1.006) (0.817) (1.435) (0.311) (0.294) (4.084)  (0.327) 
Export share  -0.457***  -0.278  -0.377**  -0.471** -0.338** -0.794***  -0.355  -0.419  -4.172** -0.223**  -0.098 -14.105**  -0.207* 
  (0.165)  (0.324) (0.145) (0.233) (0.137) (0.255) (0.293) (0.254) (1.654) (0.102) (0.096) (6.268)  (0.107) 
UN votes  8.429  33.857***  13.826***  14.246*  12.619***  12.479  15.059 11.067 -2.214  12.606*** 14.626***  21.340  7.673** 
  (5.290)  (11.373)  (4.755) (7.864) (4.495) (8.664)  (10.511) (8.664) (16.200) (3.310)  (3.102) (42.615)  (3.416) 
Constant 0.808  1.247  -5.964  -12.827* -8.279* -14.037*  -9.494 -16.183*  4.993 -11.205***  -12.345***  -125.642**  6.724** 
  (4.938)  (10.724)  (4.450) (7.441) (4.211) (8.343)  (10.118) (8.283) (16.359) (3.091)  (2.897) (53.742)  (3.202) 
                     
Sigma  3.867***  7.484*** 3.407*** 5.425*** 3.223*** 5.783*** 6.687*** 5.868*** 8.870*** 2.392*** 2.269***  19.960***  2.533*** 
  (0.253)  (0.621) (0.228) (0.406) (0.215) (0.465) (0.597) (0.467) (0.923) (0.156) (0.145) (3.303)  (0.160) 
                     
Observations  135  135 135 135 135 135 135  135  135 135  135  135  135 
Censored  obs.  11  48 15 33 15 44 58  42  76 11 7  108  5 
                     
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.                   
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Appendix 5 - Robustness tests: Coefficients of Tobit models   
             
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
  ODA total  FC grants  TC BMZ  TC GTZ  TC HR 










                                   
Robustness tests: need indicator           
HDI  -4.589*  -23.809*** -7.369*** -11.248***  -5.042**  -11.985*** -19.960***  -16.860**  -1.239  2.538  -5.214*** 
  (2.703) (5.465) (2.325) (3.381) (2.233) (4.037) (4.894) (7.881) (1.611) (1.540) (1.754) 
Infant  mortality  0.013 0.063***  0.024**  0.032** 0.016*  0.048***  0.059***  0.077*** 0.007 -0.012**  0.022*** 
  (0.010) (0.023) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.016) (0.020) (0.028) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
             
Robustness tests: institutional indicator           
Freedom 0.137  -1.003**  -0.294  -0.840***  -0.328*  -1.086*** -1.586***  0.886  0.385***  0.224*  -0.260* 
  (0.213) (0.461) (0.190) (0.317) (0.180) (0.349) (0.420) (0.604) (0.132) (0.124) (0.139) 
Law  -0.426  3.849***  0.641  2.002**  0.874 1.231 1.513 -1.523  -1.217***  0.020 -0.570 
  (0.623) (1.349) (0.560) (0.938) (0.531) (1.067) (1.298) (1.815) (0.382) (0.368) (0.408) 
Corruption  0.333  3.984*** 1.544** 2.960***  1.518*** 2.517**  2.768*  -0.826  -0.320  0.384  -0.321 
  (0.668) (1.493) (0.595) (1.013) (0.567) (1.158) (1.433) (2.044) (0.426) (0.394) (0.435) 
Failed  0.042 -0.049 -0.027 -0.035  -0.040*  -0.069 -0.098* 0.163*  0.014  -0.006  -0.003 
    (0.029) (0.061) (0.021) (0.039) (0.021) (0.048) (0.058) (0.086) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) 
             
Standard  errors  in  parentheses;  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1.         
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Appendix 6 - Extended Tobit models: Coefficients   
             
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
  ODA total  FC grants  TC BMZ  TC GTZ  TC HR 










                                   
Population  1.621*** 3.188*** 2.470*** 3.925*** 2.291*** 3.709*** 8.012***  1.651  1.774*** 1.850*** 1.055*** 
  (0.337) (0.715) (0.270) (0.497) (0.257) (0.588) (1.782) (1.039) (0.196) (0.169) (0.200) 
Per-capita GDP  -0.732*  -4.594***  -1.042*** -1.293**  -0.610*  -1.590**  3.224** -3.871***  -0.009  0.259  -0.764*** 
  (0.432) (0.907) (0.346) (0.591) (0.329) (0.686) (1.576) (1.217) (0.251) (0.217) (0.257) 
Voice  -0.250  3.081*** 0.932** 2.202*** 1.033** 2.696***  1.547  -1.842  -0.803**  -0.340  0.532* 
  (0.527) (1.099) (0.421) (0.727) (0.401) (0.841) (1.799) (1.432) (0.307) (0.265) (0.314) 
Export  share  -0.435**  -0.268  -0.348** -0.490** -0.319** -0.805***  -0.858*  -3.416** -0.204**  -0.084  -0.198** 
  (0.168) (0.315) (0.133) (0.221) (0.126) (0.253) (0.499) (1.631) (0.098) (0.084) (0.100) 
UN votes  4.608  31.346***  10.406**  8.636  9.056**  11.256 75.267***  7.509  10.824***  9.134*** 7.095** 
  (5.824)  (11.330)  (4.627) (7.735) (4.396) (8.845)  (21.126)  (15.782)  (3.388) (2.929) (3.467) 
Disaster: deaths  -0.019  -0.555  -0.482**  -0.921***  -0.470** -0.236  -0.725 1.426**  -0.191 -0.491*** -0.054 
  (0.252) (0.501) (0.201) (0.345) (0.191) (0.398) (0.905) (0.640) (0.147) (0.127) (0.150) 
DAC  aid  0.012  0.381**  0.143** 0.204* 0.130** 0.268*  0.030  0.366  0.055  -0.038  0.035 
  (0.084) (0.181) (0.067) (0.114) (0.064) (0.136) (0.239) (0.295) (0.049) (0.042) (0.050) 
Constant 2.791  -7.825  -7.437  -18.453**  -9.974**  -22.038**  -151.198***  0.691  -11.187***  -9.274***  5.858* 
  (5.835)  (11.799)  (4.684) (8.021) (4.454) (9.392)  (30.268)  (16.689)  (3.411) (2.937) (3.477) 
             
Robustness  test:  other  aid            
TC  BMZ  pure         1.488***  1.470***       0.483*** 
         (0.318)  (0.409)       (0.057) 
             
Observations  125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 
Censored  obs.  9  42 11 27 11 38 85 69  8  4  3 
             
Standard  errors  in  parentheses;  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1.          
             
 